We construct a generalized model of finite change whereby exogenous shocks such as international trade or technological change, not only contract, but totally shut down production in some sectors. In such cases even in a competitive structure and in absolute contrast to the conventional wisdom, price based strategies to protect those vanishing sectors will not be equivalent to quantity based strategies. We also consider factor trade and a similar asymmetry between price based and quantity based interventionist policies.
I. Introduction
It is widely understood that price and quantity based policy instruments yield symmetric results in a competitive framework. Quantity implications of price based policies and price implications of quantity based policies are symmetric, a particular example being the tariffquota equivalence result. However, comparative static results in the standard competitive general equilibrium models are about local changes when outputs can contract and expand but the sectors keep producing the commodity. It is rather unusual, though fairly realistic to conceive of cases when exogenous shocks can eliminate some of the production. International price shocks or technological innovation can eliminate sectors or lead to the emergence of new ones.
In trade theory, such a regime change has come to be known as finite change. Jones and Findlay (2000) and Jones (2008) provide examples where a finite change can alter standard comparative static results. Jones and Findlay (2000) analyzed the effects of a finite change in techniques and showed, for illustration, that labor-saving technical progress can result in lowered real wages, even if it is concentrated in the more labor-intensive of two commodities initially produced. Jones (2008) showed that large shocks to equilibrium may change a country's production pattern with trade, and such shocks are provide a non-monotonic response. In an early paper, Jones and Marjit (1985) had explained a particular kind of finite change that converts a fairly arbitrary multi-good multi-factor autarkic model to either a specific-factors model (SFM) or a combination of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model and SFM.
1 In this paper, we provide a generalized version of finite change models when goods outnumber factors of production. While this fits well with continued interests in higher dimensional issues in trade theory, 2 we focus on the fact that certain exogenous shocks (such as, though certainly not limited to, exposure to international trade) allow only a subset of commodities to be produced under competitive conditions and domestic production of certain goods will vanish.
Typically, if policymakers are interested in pursuing quantity or price based instruments to support some of the sectors that keep producing in the changed environment, the effect will be symmetric. But once policymakers worry about supporting the sectors which are currently nonfunctioning, the price and quantity based instruments can offer entirely different results. One example is the tariff and quota non-equivalence, as shown in Choi and Marjit (1996) . It is not a stretch to imagine several other policies that will yield a similar outcome Therefore, comparative static results change under finite alterations of the general equilibrium structure.
Our general set up embodies many special cases and results that are available with small scale general equilibrium structure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II develops the basic analytical framework. Section III discusses policy experiments in terms of comparative statistics. The final section gathers our concluding remarks.
II. Model
Let us consider a standard neo-classical general equilibrium production model with n goods and m factors of production. Goods are indexed by 1,..., i n  and factors by 1,..., j m  .
Competitive equilibrium conditions ensure
where j W and i P represent factor and commodity prices, respectively. We chose the th n good as the numéraire.
Full employment conditions are given by
where i X and i V are output and stock of factors of production, respectively. The market clearing conditions are
Note that collection of equations (1), (2) Ethier (1982) , Jones and Marjit (1985) , Beladi (1999), Feenstra (2003) , and Jones (2014) . 3 By Walras Law one of the market clearing equations will be redundant and we shall define (n-1) relative prices. match local supply. Therefore, given the set of prices in (1), we need to determine m factor prices for n m  . We now write down the following proposition. 

In the former case, with strict inequality, the th k good will not be produced. Thus, we ignore the equality part because the goods are distinct and the probability that the LHS and RHS in (4) will match is zero, given that LHS and RHS in (4) both are exogenous. In the latter case the th k good won't be produced because at least one j W can earn more in this sector. This will imply that at least one good in the set {1..., } m must vanish. Since k is arbitrary, the outcome holds for any good. Therefore, more than m number of goods will not be produced. [QED] Without any loss of generality, let us suppose that the first m goods are produced and 
The rest of the system remains the same. Suppose the new equilibrium is denoted by { } Jones and Marjit (1985) to provide a condition that this is necessarily so. But s or r , it will serve our purpose.
Let us define,
Note that since 
b) Factor Trade
Our argument can be easily extended in case of factor trade as well.
Consider the case where in autarky there are n goods and n factors of production and one of the factors, call it capital K, is allowed to emigrate as the world rate of return r* > r , the local autarkic rate of return. This immediately converts the model to one where good outnumber locally fully employed factors of production. But here we consider policies to control factor trade. One reason might be that if K earns r*, given the set of commodity prices some factor must earn less than its autarkic return and those factors might lobby for capital control.
It is clear with price control the government imposes a tax t on r* with r*(1-t) =r.
In fact following the previous argument, it is obvious that there is an equilibrium where K will not move out at all. On the other hand explicit quota on export of K will be less restrictive.
IV. Concluding Remarks
A vast majority of studies in the area of international trade theory typically relies on results from comparative static exercises hinged on infinitesimal changes. Such analyses fails to take into cognizance the realistic possibility that the direction of change in key variables can be sensitive to sufficiently large shocks to the original equilibrium, commonly known as finite changes, due to an alteration in the pattern of production. This paper offers a generalized model of such finite changes when goods outnumber factors of production. We demonstrate how, under competitive conditions, some exogenous shocks (e.g. exposure to international trade) can lead to only a subset of commodities being produced while eliminating the domestic production of some of the other goods.
